We study the automated verification of pointer safety for heap-manipulating imperative programs with unknown procedure calls. Given a Hoare-style partial correctness specification S = {Pre} C {Post} in separation logic, where the program C contains calls to some unknown procedure U , we infer a specification SU for the unknown procedure U from the calling contexts. We show that the problem of verifying the program C against the specification S can be safely reduced to the problem of proving that the procedure U (once its code is available) meets the derived specification SU . The expected specification SU for the unknown procedure U is automatically calculated using an abduction-based shape analysis. We have also implemented a prototype system to validate the viability of our approach. Preliminary results show that the specifications derived by our tool fully capture the behaviors of the unknown code in many cases.
Introduction
While automated verification of memory safety remains a big challenge [14, 21] , especially for substantial system software such as the Linux distribution and device drivers, significant advances have been seen recently on the automated verification of pointer safety for such software [6, 22] . The abduction-based compositional shape analysis [6] is able to calculate the pre/post specifications for procedures in a bottom-up approach, based on the call-dependency graph. It can verify the pointer safety of a large portion of the Linux kernel and many device drivers manipulating shared mutable data structures. One issue that has not been dealt within their work is unknown procedure calls. In their SpaceInvader tool, unknown calls are currently ignored and replaced by the empty statement skip during the verification. This may lead to imprecise or unsound results in general. Our work here is to investigate this issue carefully and provide a better solution to the verification of pointer safety of programs with unknown calls.
Automated program verifiers usually require to have access to the entire given program, which in practice may not be completely available for various reasons. For instance, some programs (e.g. in C) may contain unknown calls that correspond to function pointers, some programs (e.g. in OO) may contain calls to interface methods whose actual implementations may not be available statically, or some programs may have calls to library procedures whose code is not available during verification. Other possible scenarios can be found in remote procedure calls such as COM/DCOM [20] , mobile code and software upgrading, where program fragments may be unavailable at verification time. To deal with the verification of programs with unknown procedure calls, current automated program verifiers either • ignore the unknown procedure calls, e.g. replacing them by skip [6] , which can be unsound in general; or • assume that the program and the unknown procedure have disjoint memory footprints so that the unknown call can be safely ignored due to the hypothetical frame rule [18] ; however, this assumption does not hold in many cases; or • use specification mining [1] to discover possible specifications for the (unknown part of the) program, which is performed dynamically by observing the execution traces and is not likely to be exhaustive for all possible program behaviors; or • take into account all possible implementations for the unknown procedure [10, 12] .
In general, there can be too many such candidates, making the verification almost impossible at compile time; or • simply stop at the first unknown procedure call and provide an incomplete verification, which is obviously undesirable.
Approach and contributions. We propose a different approach in this paper to the verification of programs with unknown procedure calls. Given a specification S = {Pre} C {Post} for the program C containing calls to an unknown procedure U, our solution is to proceed with the verification for the known fragments of C, and at the same time infer a specification S U that is expected for the unknown procedure U based on the calling context(s). The problem of verifying the program C against the specification S can now be safely reduced to the problem of verifying the procedure U against the inferred specification S U , provided that the verification of the known fragments does not cause any problems. The inferred specification is subject to a later verification when an implementation or a specification for the unknown procedure becomes available (e.g. at loading time in Java). The intuition of our method to infer the unknown procedure's specification can be divided into two steps. The first step is to analyze the code before the unknown procedure call to discover its precondition. The second is to analyze the code after the unknown call in order to discover its postcondition. For the second step, one might suggest to use a deductive backwards analysis, starting from the postcondition of the program being verified, to derive an expected postcondition for the unknown procedure. We cannot follow this suggestion due to a technical challenge: backwards reasoning over the separation domain is simply too costly to implement ( [6] ). Therefore, we exploit an abductive forwards reasoning [6, 11] to derive the unknown procedure's postcondition, and in this way the verification can be accomplished.
Our paper makes the following technical contributions: • We propose a novel framework in separation logic for the verification of pointer safety for programs with unknown calls.
• The top-down feature of our approach can potentially benefit the general software development process. Given the specification for the caller procedure, it can be used to infer the specification for the callee procedures. This is a potentially beneficial complement for current bottom-up approaches ( [13] ).
• We have enhanced the abduction mechanism, resulting in an improved algorithm for the verification use. Compared with bi-abductive analysis [6] we have added additional reasoning rules (e.g. for the list tail matching) such that the use of inaccurate reasoning rules (like the "missing" rule) is avoided in many cases. We have also introduced a more practical partial order to judge the quality of different solutions for abduction.
• We have successfully incorporated the call-by-reference mechanism into the forward analyses in the separation domain.
• We have built a prototype system to test the viability and performance of our approach, and we have conducted some initial experimental studies to evaluate the precision of the results and the scalability of our system. Preliminary results show that our tool can derive expressive specifications which fully capture the behaviors of the unknown code in many cases. Outline. Section 2 employs a motivating example to informally illustrate our main approach. Section 3 presents the programming language and the abstract domain for our analysis. Section 4 introduces our abductive reasoning. Section 5 defines two abstract semantics used in our verification. Section 6 depicts our verification algorithms. Experimental results are shown in Section 7, followed by some concluding remarks.
A Motivating Example
In this section we illustrate informally, via an example, how our analysis infers the specification for an unknown procedure. Our analysis makes use of a separation domain similar to the one used in the SpaceInvader tool [6, 9] . To keep the presentation simple, we use a small imperative language with both call-by-value and call-by-reference parameters for procedures. Formal details about the abstract domain and the language will be given in Section 3. Example 1. Our goal is to verify the procedure findLast against the given pre/post specifications shown in Figure 1 . The data structure node { int data; node next } defines a node in a linked list. The predicate ls(x, y) used in the pre/post specifications as well as other places denotes a (possibly empty) list segment referred to by x and ended with the pointer y (i.e., y denotes the next field of the last node). Its formal definition is given in page 7.
According to the given specification, the procedure findLast takes in a non-empty linked list x and stores a reference to the last node of the list in the call-by-reference parameter z. Here we group call-by-value and call-by-reference parameters together and use semicolon ; to separate them. Note that findLast calls an unknown procedure unkProc at line 4.
2 For this example, the unknown call to unkProc performs essential modification to a local variable, so it can neither be regarded as skip nor dealt with using the hypothetical frame rule. The candidate implementations of unkProc are not available, preventing a verification against all possible candidates. However our approach is still applicable here as described below.
We conduct a symbolic execution ( [4, 16] ) on the procedure body starting with the precondition Pre findLast (line 0a). The results of our analysis (e.g. the abstract states) are marked as comments in the code. The analysis carries on as a standard forward shape analysis until the unknown procedure call at line 4.
At line 3, the current symbolic heap ∆ is split into two disjoint parts: the local part H (line 3b) that is dependent on, and possibly mutated by, the unknown procedure; and the frame part R 0 (line 3c) that is not accessed by the unknown procedure. Intuitively, the local part of a symbolic heap w.r.t. a set of variables X is the part of the heap reachable from variables in X (together with the aliasing information); while the frame part denotes the unreachable heap part (together with the aliasing information). For example, for a symbolic heap ls(x, w) * ls(y, z) * ls(z, null) ∧ w=z, its local part w.r.t. {x} is ls(x, w) * ls(z, null) ∧ w=z, and its frame part w.r.t. {x} is ls(y, z) ∧ w=z. We will have their formal definitions in Section 6.
We take H (line 3b) as a crude precondition for the unknown procedure, since it denotes the symbolic heap that is accessible, and hence potentially usable, by the unknown call. The frame part R 0 is not touched by the unknown call and will remain in the post-state, as shown in line 4a.
At line 4a, the abstract state after the unknown call consists of two parts: one is the aforesaid frame R 0 not accessed by the call, and the other is due to the procedure's postcondition which is unfortunately not available. Our next step is to discover the postcondition by examining (the requirements of) the code fragment after the unknown call by doing abductive reasoning (line 4a to 5c).
Initially, we assume the unknown procedure having an empty heap M 0 as its postcondition 1 , and gradually discover the missing parts of the postcondition during the symbolic execution of the code fragment after the unknown call. To do that, our analysis keeps track of a pair (∆, M) at each program point, where ∆ refers to the current heap state, and M denotes the expected postcondition discovered so far for the unknown procedure. The notations M i are used to represent parts of the discovered postcondition.
At line 5, the procedure findLast is called recursively. Since the current heap state does not satisfy the precondition of findLast (as shown in line 4b), the verification fails. However, this is not necessarily due to a program error; it may be due to the fact that the unknown call's postcondition is still unknown. Therefore, our analysis performs an abductive reasoning (line 4c) to infer the missing part M 1 for ∆ such that ∆ * M 1 entails the precondition of findLast w.r.t. some substitution [y/x]. As shown in line 4d, M 1 is inferred to be ls(y, null) ∧ y =null, which is accumulated into M as part of the expected postcondition of the unknown procedure. (We will explain the details for abductive reasoning in Sec 4.) Now the heap state combined with the inferred M 1 meets the precondition of the procedure findLast, and also generates a residual frame heap R 1 (line 4e).
The heap state ∆ immediately after the recursive call (line 5a) is formed by findLast's postcondition and the frame R 1 , and it is expected to establish the postcondition of findLast for the overall verification to succeed. However, it does not (as shown in line 5b). Again this might be due to the fact that part of the unknown call's postcondition is still missing. Therefore, we perform another abductive reasoning (line 5c) to infer the missing M 2 as follows:
such that ∆ * M 2 entails Post findLast . In this case, our abductor returns M 2 :=ls(x, y) as the result which is then added into M by separation conjunction, as shown in line 5c.
Finally, we generate the expected pre/post-specification for the unknown procedure (lines 6a and 6b). The precondition is obtained from the local pre-state of the unknown call, H, by replacing all variables that are aliases of a (or b) with the formal parameter a (or b). The postcondition is obtained from the accumulated abduction result, M, after performing the same substitution. Our discovered specification for the unknown procedure unkProc(a;b) is:
The entire program is correct if unkProc meets the derived specification.
Programming Language and Abstract Domain
In this section, we first depict the syntax of a language in which programs may invoke unknown procedures, and then present the abstract domain for our analysis.
To focus only on key issues, we use a simple imperative language:
Note that expressions (E) are program variables to record memory locations in the heap, and all program variables are assumed of the same type, reference. The language has both heap sensitive (A[E]) and heap insensitive (A) atomic commands. The former requires access to the heap location referred to by E, while the latter does not. The command C contains calls to known procedures only, while the commands U and V comprise unknown procedure calls. Note also that our language allows both call-by-value and call-by-reference parameters for procedures, and for convenience, we group call-by-value parameters on the left and call-by-reference ones on the right, separated by a semicolon. The unknown commands U and V specify the possible scenarios in which an unknown call (unkFn(x; y)) may occur. Note that U and V may be annotated with two sets of variables, e.g. (x 0 , y 0 ) in the definition of V , where x 0 denotes variables that can be accessed, but cannot be modified by V , and where y 0 denotes variables that may be mutated by V . The same annotation applies to U . These annotations can be obtained automatically via a pre-processing phase of the analysis, by recording all the variables appearing in V as the right(left)-value of an assignment, and/or as a call-by-value(reference) parameter of a procedure invocation [17] .
Example 2 (Unknown procedure and unknown block). The parse tree of findLast's body (omitting local variable definition) in our motivating example is as in Figure 2 . 2
cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc c g g g g g g g g g g g g g g C(skip) U (x;y) (unkProc(x; y)) C(findLast(y, z)) A program P is composed of several procedures (with one of them as the entry method). A procedure can be totally known to the verifier (so that its body is composed by C), or it may contain an unknown block V .
We use a memory model similar to the standard one for separation logic [19] :
The slight difference is that we have three (disjoint) set of variables: a finite set of program variables Var = {x, y, ..}, logical variables LVar = {x , y , ..}, and the special (logical) variables SVar = {a, b, ..}, with the last set reserved for unknown procedures for specification purpose. As usual, Loc is a countably infinite set of locations, subsumed by the set of values Val. The function Heap denotes a partial mapping from locations to values and a program state is a pair of stack and heap.
An abstract (program) state in our analysis is a symbolic heap representing a set of concrete heaps. It is defined as follows:
Basic separation predicates
The expressions (x, x and a) correspond to the three kinds of variables (program, logical and special ones). Pure formulae Π express the aliasing information among expressions. The basic separation predicate B(E 1 , E 2 ) denotes either a singleton heap or a list segment [6, 9, 16] . A (possibly empty) list segment is inductively defined as follows:
Here the list segment predicate is regarded as a built-in predicate in our abstract domain, as our abstract semantics and abduction are fine tuned for it. According to SpaceInvader [6] we may extend it with other predicates. A symbolic heap H is composed of a pure formula Π and a separation formula Σ, possibly with existential quantifications over them. The separation formula Σ is formed by the predicates B(E 1 , E 2 ), true (arbitrary heaps) and emp (an empty heap) via separation conjunction [19] . We use SH to denote the set of all symbolic heaps and we will use the two terms "symbolic heap" and "abstract state" interchangeably. The semantics of a symbolic heap H [3, 4] is defined by the satisfaction relationship (s, h) |= H between a pair of stack and heap states (s, h) and H, where s ∈ Stack and h ∈ Heap:
where h 1 and h 2 are domain-disjoint and the semantics of ls(E 1 , E 2 ) can be obtained from its inductive definition over the abstract domain. Based on such semantics, the entailment relationship between two symbolic heaps H 1 and H 2 is straightforward:
which is used to check whether one symbolic heap is stronger than another in our analysis.
Abduction
As shown in Example 1 (Section 2), when analyzing the code after an unknown call, due to the lack of information about the unknown procedure, it is possible that the current state is too weak to meet the required precondition for the next instruction. As a consequence, the symbolic execution fails. A technique called abduction (or abductive reasoning) [6, 11] can be used to discover a symbolic heap M to make the entailment ∆ * M H * R succeed, when the entailment ∆ H * R fails. Here R denotes the (automatically computed) frame part. For instance, the entailments at line 4b and line 5b failed in Example 1, and in both cases, the abduction algorithm was called to find the missing M .
One problem in abduction is that there can be many solutions of M for the entailment ∆ * M H * R to succeed. For instance, false can be a solution but should be avoided where possible. As another example, for the entailment ls(y, z) * M ls(x, z) * R (a similar one was at line 5c in Example 1 in Sec 2), an abductive reasoning may return, for example, two different solutions: M = ls(x, y) with R = emp or M = ls(x, z) with R = ls(y, z). A partial order over symbolic heaps was given by Calcagno et al. [6] to make the selection from different solutions:
Intuitively speaking, consider two symbolic heaps M and M , if M entails M (possibly extended by some frame), then M is less than M under . For example, we have ls(x, y) ls(x, y) * ls(y, z), and emp ∨ ∃x, y.ls(x, y) emp.
With such partial order , we can judge the quality of different solutions for abduction by always choosing the least one according to .
Two solutions can not be distinguished when they are not comparable under this partial order. However, we may still prefer one solution over another in this case, as will be discussed in Section 6. We would expect that the solution to incur as few free variables as possible in the frame part (R). For this reason, we define a new order as follows:
Note that our partial order is defined over the set of solutions for one abduction. Intuitively, given two solutions which are not comparable w.r.t. , our partial order may still be able to compare them, if one incurs fewer free variables in the frame R than the other.
To ensure that the abductor will choose the former, but not the latter, we enrich the abductor [6] with some new rules (right column below) so that it attempts to introduce less free variables in the frame, where possible:
where the rules from Calcagno et al. [6] are on the left and our new ones are on the right. Compared with their work, when the matching from the head of a list segment fails, our abductor also tries to match from the tail, instead of directly applying missing rule to introduce a new separation predicate, which could bring in more free variables in the frame. In our case, the rule t-match introduces aliasing information between two heads of pointing-to relationships in the premise and conclusion of the abduction, respectively. The last two rules try to match from the end of a basic separation predicate; if the matching succeeds then the matched part will be dropped from both sides to reduce the complexity of the predicates. For instance, in Example 1 in Section 2, for the last abduction ∃y . ls(y, z) * z →null * [M] ls(x, z) * z →null their abductor will return ls(x, z) as M, by trying to match the heads of the list segments on both sides of , and adding the missing heap part to the left hand side once the matching fails. This solution is not optimal in the light that it introduces a free variable z in the frame. Comparatively, our abduction tries to match also from the tail of a list segment, finding ls(x, y) as the result for the aforesaid abduction, which is a minimal solution under our partial order
We prefer to find solutions that are (potentially locally) minimal with respect to ∆ H and consistent. However, such solutions are generally not easy to compute and can incur excess cost (with additional disjunction in the analysis). Therefore, our abductive inference is designed more from a practical perspective to discover anti-frames that should be suitable as specifications for unknown procedures, and the order ∆ H is to state the decision choices of our implementation of the abduction. This is proven in Sec 7 with the experiments we conduct.
Abstract Semantics
This section introduces two kinds of abstract semantics we use to analyze the program: an underlying semantics from the local shape analysis ( [9] ) and another semantics based on both the first one and abduction from the composite shape analysis ( [6] ).
We denote the specifications of a procedure f (x; y) as a subset of SH × (SH ∪ { }) (where stands for a fault abstract state). Note that for a call-by-reference parameter x, both old(x) and x may occur in a postcondition with the former referring to the value of x in the pre-state (as in JML [15] ).To illustrate, a postcondition ls(old(x), x) means that there is a list segment beginning with the initial value of x (present in the precondition) to the final x when the procedure returns. The set of all specifications for all procedures is defined as AllSpec = df P(Name × P(SH × (SH ∪ { }))) where Name refers to the set of all function names. Then our underlying abstract semantics' type is defined as
|[C]| : AllSpec → P (SH) → P (SH) where P (SH) stands for P(SH ∪ { }). Given a program C, a specification table T ∈ AllSpec, a set of abstract states S, |[C]| T S returns another set of abstract states.
Example 3 (Underlying semantics). For the findLast in our motivating example, suppose the specification table T is
The basic transition functions below form the foundation of the first underlying semantics. With one symbolic heap as input, they return either another symbolic heap or a set of symbolic heaps:
where SH[E] denotes a set of symbolic heaps in which each element has E exposed as the head in one of its pointing-to conjuncts (E →F ). Here rearr(E) attempts to unroll the shape beginning with E to expose it as the head of a pointing-to predicate, say, E points to another expression. (If such unrolling fails then it will return { }.) This is a preparation for the second transition function exec(A[E]), as it tries to perform some dereference of E. The third function, like the semantics for stack-based variable assignment and heap allocation, does not require such exposure of E, and thus is called heap-insensitive compared with the second one. The last transition function conducts a rolling over the shapes, to eliminate unimportant cutpoints to ensure termination for our verification.
The rules for the basic transition functions are adopted from Distefano et al. [9] , where the logical variable x is always fresh.
Below are the rules for rearrangement, where we try to find an explicit pointing-to beginning with the expression E to be unrolled (or its alias). If such unrolling fails then { } is returned.
Below are rules for symbolic execution to reflect the effects, over heap or not, of atomic commands.
Below are definitions of rules for abstraction. Their rationale is to remove any heap garbage from the current state and eliminate logical cutpoints that are neither shared nor essential in denoting a cyclic list over the heap. In our semantics, when the abstraction is actually performed, the six rules are applied several rounds, with each round from the top one to the bottom, until the abstracted state does not change any more. Its termination is discussed later in Section 6.2.
Abs2
A lifting function p † is defined over partial functions on symbolic heaps to lift their domains and ranges to a powerset of SH, plus :
and this function is overloaded for rearr only to lift its domain to P (SH):
The following function, filt, is to filter out any symbolic heap that does not satisfy the given aliasing constraint:
and the program constructors' semantics are based on the atomic ones defined above:
Finally we need to adapt the underlying abstract semantics to procedure invocation:
where (f, Spec f ) ∈ T and y are fresh where T is an element of AllSpec. We assume here the formal parameters in f 's specifications are expressed in terms of a, b and old(b), respectively. We first check whether the procedure's precondition is satisfied by the current state (subject to substitution), and then replace it with the (substituted) postcondition to indicate the effect of the procedure call.
Next we define the abstract semantics with abduction used in our verification to discover the effect of unknown procedure calls.
. Given a specification table T ∈ AllSpec, each element of the input (or output) for
T is a pair of two symbolic heaps, of which the first denotes the current program state, and the second stands for the abduction result. In our framework, this semantics is used to accumulate the discovered effect of unknown procedure calls into the second symbolic heap in the pair.
Example 4 (Abstract semantics with abduction). Consider the same setting for findLast in Example 3. For the semantics with abduction |[findLast(x, y)]|
A T {ls(x, null)}, we will have {(ls(x, y) * y →null, x =null)} as result. Here in order to obtain the first component of the pair as the final state (ls(x, y) * y →null), the second component (x =null) must be added to its corresponding input state ls(x, null).
2
This semantics also consists of the basic transition functions which composes the atomic instructions' semantics and then the program constructors' semantics. Here the basic transition functions are lifted as follows:
Rearr(E)(H, M) = df let H=rearr(E)(H) and S={(H , M)|H ∈ H ∩ SH} in if ( / ∈ H) then S else if (H E=a for some a ∈ SVar) and (M a →x for fresh
x ∈ LVar) then S ∪ {(H * E →x , M * a →x )} else S ∪ { }
Exec(A)(H, M) = df let H=exec(A)(H)in {(H , M)|H ∈ H} ∪ { | ∈ H} where A is [E] := G or dispose(E)
Exec(x := E)(∃x .Π∧∆, M) = df (∃x .x=σE ∧ σ(Π∧∆), σM) Exec(x := [E])(∃x .Π∧∆ * E →F ) = df (∃x .x=σF ∧ σ(Π∧∆ * E →F ), σM) | (∃x .Π∧∆) = df if ∃x .Π∧∆ * E →F false then ( , σM) else (∃x .x=σF ∧ σ(Π∧∆ * E →F ), σ(M * E →F )) Exec(x := new(E))(∃x .Π∧∆) = df (∃x .σ(Π∧∆) * x →σE, σM)
Abs(H, M) = df (abs(H), abs(M))
In the lifted Rearr, in case of a rearrangement failure, we utilize abduction to discover a pointing-to in the current heap, followed by another attempt of rearrangement. If it succeeds, then the abduction result is confirmed and added to the current state. Note that in the definition of Exec we need to treat variable assignments specifically. As can be seen in the rules, when x is assigned to a new value, the original value is still preserved in a fresh logical variable x with a substitution σ = [x /x]. This allows us to keep the connection among the history values of a variable and its latest value, which may be essential as a link from the unknown procedure's postcondition to its caller's postcondition. This is because the unknown procedure's postcondition may refer to one of such variable's historical values, and its caller's postcondition can count on that variable's final value. In that case, the recorded values in the abduction results will serve as a connection among these abstract states. Abs simply performs abstraction over both H and M. The filter function Filt now only works on the first symbolic heap of a pair:
and the abstract semantics for the program constructors is as follows:
Same as above, at last is the semantics for procedure invocation with abduction:
where (f, Spec f ) ∈ T and y are fresh where T is an element of AllSpec. We also use a, b and old(b) for formal parameters in the specification. This rule distinguishes two cases: 1. the current state in S is sufficiently strong to entail Pre subject to some substitutions, and corresponding postcondition is established; 2. the current state does not entail substituted Pre, and abduction is applied with further requirements on the current state accumulated (M ). It will combine the results from both cases to update the state after the procedure invocation and continue with the symbolic execution.
Verification
Based on the abstract semantics defined in the last section, we present in this section our algorithms for the verification of programs with unknown calls.
Main Verification Algorithm
1. Main algorithm. Our verification algorithm given in Figure 3 attempts to verify the body of the current procedure (the third input, comprising an unknown command U ) against the given specifications (the second input). The first input gives a set of known procedure specifications, which are necessary as the current procedure may invoke known procedures apart from unknown ones. If the verification succeeds, it returns specifications that are expected for all unknown procedures invoked within U for the whole verification to succeed. If it fails, we know that the current procedure cannot meet one or more given specifications, no matter what specifications are given to the invoked unknown procedures. Returned specifications will be expressed using special variables a, b, etc. as in the earlier example.
For each specification (Pre, Post) to verify against (line 2), the algorithm works in three steps. Based on the underlying semantics mentioned earlier, it first computes the post-states of C 1 (i.e. S 0 ) from Pre (line 3), from which it extracts the preconditions for U (x;y) using the function Local. Intuitively, it extracts the part of each ∆ 1 reachable from the variables that may be accessed by U , namely, x and y (line 6). Here fv(∆) stands for all free (program and logical) variables occurring in ∆. The function Local(Π ∧ Σ, {x}) is defined as follows:
where ReachVar(Π∧Σ, {x}) is the minimal set of variables reachable from {x}:
where B(z 1 , z 2 ) stands for either z 1 →z 2 or ls(z 1 , z 2 ). And the formula ReachHeap(Π∧Σ, {x}) denotes the part of Σ reachable from {x} and is formally defined as the * -conjunction of the following set of formulae:
The second step is to symbolically execute C 2 , using the abstract semantics with abduction, to discover the postconditions for U (x;y) (lines 8-10). At line 8, since we know nothing about U , we take emp as the post-state of U . Therefore, the initial state for the symbolic execution of C 2 is simply the frame part of state not touched by U . Here Frame is formally defined as
where UnreachHeap(Π∧Σ, {x}) is the formula consisting of all * -conjuncts from Σ which are not in ReachHeap(Π∧Σ, {x}).
Note that x=a ∧ y=b ∧ z=c are used to record the snapshot of variables associated with U using the special variables a, b and c. The symbolic execution of C 2 at line 8
end foreach 17 end foreach 18 end foreach There can be some complication here. Note that there can be a potential bug in the program, or the given specification is not sufficient. As a consequence of that, the result M returned by our abductor may contain more information than what can be expected from U , in which case we cannot simply regard the whole M as the postcondition of U . For example, consider the code fragment unknown(x); z:=y.next with the precondition x →null. Before the second instruction (dereference of y.next) we use abduction to get y =null. However, noting the fact y / ∈ReachVar(∆, {x}) where ∆ = emp∧y =null is the state immediately after the unknown call plus the abduction result, we know that from the unknown call's parameters (x), y is not reachable, and hence the unknown call will never establish a state where y =null. In that case we are assured that the procedure being verified cannot meet the specification.
To detect such a situation, we introduce the check in line 10. It tests whether the whole abduction result is reachable from variables accessed by U . If not, then the unreachable part cannot be expected from U , which indicates a possible bug in the program or some inconsistency between the program and its specification. In such cases, the algorithm returns an additional formula that can be used by a further analysis to either identify the bug or strengthen the specification. Recall the example presented in the previous paragraph: since y =null cannot be established by the unknown call, if we add it to the precondition of the code fragment (to form a new precondition x →null ∧ y =null), then the verification with the new specification can move on and will potentially succeed. We will exemplify this later with experimental results.
The third step (lines [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] is to form the derived specifications for U in terms of variables a, b and g, where g denotes logical variables not directly accessed by U , but occurring in both pre-and postconditions. The formula sub alias(M, {a, b, c}) is obtained from M by replacing all variables with their aliases in {a, b, c}. It is defined as
where a set of substitutions before a formula M denotes the result of applying all those substitutions to M, and aliases(M, x) returns all the aliases of x in M.
Finally, at line 19, the obtained specifications Spec U for U are passed to the case analysis algorithm (given in Figure 4 ) to derive the specifications of unknown procedures invoked in U . At line 20, we conduct a post analysis for soundness purpose.
2. Case analysis algorithm. In order to discover specifications for unknown procedures invoked in U , the algorithm in Figure 4 conducts a case analysis according to the structure of U . In the first case (line 2), U is simply an unknown call. In this situation, the algorithm simply returns all the pre-/postcondition pairs from Spec U as the unknown procedure's specifications.
In the second case (line 4), U is an if construct and each branch contains an unknown block. The algorithm uses the main algorithm to verify the two branches separately with preconditions Pre∧b and Pre∧¬b respectively, where Pre is one of the preconditions of the whole if. The results obtained from the two branches are then combined using the operator:
where Refine is defined as
The intuition of Refine is to eliminate any specification (Pre , Post ) from a set if there exists a "stronger" one (Pre, Post) such that Pre Pre and Post Post. is to refine the union of two specification sets. The third and fourth cases (line 10 and 15) are for if constructs which contain one unknown block in one branch. This is handled in a similar way as in the second case. The only difference is that, for the branch without unknown blocks, we need to verify it with the underlying semantics (line 13).
The fifth case is the while loop. In the motivating example in Section 2, we have shown that our approach is able to handle the verification of a tail-recursive function provided with both pre-and postconditions, our solution here is to translate the while loop into a tail-recursive function to verify it. As can be seen in lines 16 -20, the algorithm generates a new function loop for the while loop, and takes the variables accessed by V to be its parameters. Note that the read-only variables (x) become call-by-value parameters and other possibly mutable ones (y) become call-by-reference parameters (which is one reason for us to introduce call-by-reference parameters in our language). The algorithm then adds the specifications found for the while loop as loop's specifications into table T , verifying it, and at the same time obtaining specifications for the unknown procedure in the while loop, using the main algorithm Verify.
In the last case (line 21), where U consists of multiple unknown procedure calls in sequence, the algorithm invokes another algorithm, SeqUnkCalls, to deal with it.
3. Verifying sequential unknown calls. To handle the most complicated case, unknown procedure calls in sequence, we still need the SeqUnkCalls algorithm. First we illustrate the brief idea using two sequential unknown procedure calls as an example, followed by the general algorithm.
Suppose we have {Pre} {unkFn 1 (x 0 ; y 0 ); C; unkFn 2 (x 1 ; y 1 )} {Post} where C is the only known code fragment within the block. Our current solution attempts to find a common specification to capture both unknown procedures' behaviors. The algorithm works in three steps. In the first step, it extracts the precondition for the first procedure, say Pre U , from the given precondition Pre by extracting the part of heap that may be accessed by the call via x 0 and y 0 , which is similar to the first step of the main algorithm Verify. Aiming at a general specification for both unknown calls, it then assumes that the second procedure has a similar precondition Pre U . In the second step, it symbolically executes the code fragment C with the help of the abductor, to discover a crude postcondition, say Post 0 U , expected from the first unknown call. This is similar to the second step of the main algorithm Verify, except that the postcondition for C is now assumed to be Pre U . In the third step, the algorithm takes Post U to obtain the final postcondition Post U for the unknown procedures. Note that this strengthening does not affect soundness: the strengthened Post U can still be used as a general postcondition for both unknown procedures. Figure 5 presents the algorithm to infer specifications for n (n ≥ 2) unknown calls in sequence. As aforementioned, given a block of (n+1) unknown procedure calls with n pieces of known code blocks sandwiched among them (unkFn(x 0 ; y 0 ) {; C i ; unkFn(x i ; y i )} n i=1 in line 1), and the specification (Pre, Post) (line 3) for such a block, our approach generally works in three steps: first, to compute a precondition for the unknown calls; second, to verify each code fragment C i (i = 1, ..., n) with abduction to collect expected behavior of the unknown calls (as part of their postcondition); third, to guarantee that the collected postcondition satisfies Post. If not, then another abduction is conducted to strengthen the gained postcondition to ensure this.
The first step is completed by lines 4 to 6. The local part of Pre is extracted w.r.t. the first unknown call's parameters x 0 and y 0 . Other free variables are distinguished as z 0 , which may be ghost variables. Finally the precondition is found in terms of special logical variables a, b and c.
The second step is performed over each C i ; unkFn(x i ; y i ). Its main idea is to take the postcondition generated for the last unknown call (Post i−1 ), plus the frame part during the entailment check against Pre i−1 , as the post-state of unkFn(x i−1 ; y i−1 ), and try to verify C i beginning with such a state, using abduction when necessary (line 9). After the verification we get S i containing abstract states before unkFn(x i ; y i ), and we want those states to satisfy its precondition Pre U subject to substitution. Note that during the verification of C i and the last satisfaction checking we may use abduction to strengthen the program state, whose results reflect the expected behavior of unkFn(x i−1 ; y i−1 ) and are accumulated as its expected postcondition. Hence we achieve a sufficiently strong postcondition for each unknown call.
end foreach 21 end foreach 22 return R end Algorithm The third step is similar to the first algorithm: it checks whether the final abstract state entails the postcondition of the whole block, and strengthens the final abstract state with abduction if it cannot. Then the ghost variables are recognized and processed analogously to the first algorithm. Finally the strongest specifications discovered for those unknown procedures are returned.
Note that our current solution tries to find a common specification (Pre, Post) suitable for all the unknown procedures. Generally we may allow the unknown procedures to have different specifications. In theory, this can be achieved by a more in-depth analysis which examines the known code fragments in between those unknown calls. That is, by analyzing the code fragment C i we would hopefully obtain a postcondition for the (i−1)-th procedure and a precondition for the i-th. In the case of two unknown calls unkFn 0 (x 0 ; y 0 ); C 1 ; unkFn 1 (x 1 ; y 1 ), the precondition for unkFn 0 and the postcondition for unkFn 1 can be obtained as usual (by analyzing the code before unkFn 0 and after unkFn 1 respectively). To derive the postcondition Post 0 for unkFn 0 and the precondition Pre 1 for unkFn 1 , we initialize Post 0 to be emp to start a forward analysis over C 1 with abduction, to accumulate (via abduction) the expected behavior of unkFn 0 (for C 1 to be verified) as Post 0 , and extract a formula (which is relevant to the footprint of unkFn 1 ) from the abstract state at the end of C 1 as Pre 1 . However, our initial experiments show that, unless the fragment C 1 is sufficiently complex to expose enough information expected from unkFn 0 , the derived Post 0 and Pre 1 can be rather weak. As a consequence, the derived specification for unkFn 0 can be too weak (with a weak postcondition) and the one for unkFn 1 can be too strong (with a weak precondition). It remains an open problem how we might tune the derived results to obtain more reasonable specifications. We conjecture that certain heuristics might help and we will explore this further in our future work.
Soundness and Termination
Informally, in the presence of unknown procedure calls, the soundness of the verification signifies that, a program is successfully verified against its specifications, if all the unknown procedures that it invokes conform to the specifications discovered by the verification algorithm. Therefore, the correctness of the program depends on a (possible) further verification for the unknown procedures.
The soundness of our verification algorithm is guaranteed at line 20 in the algorithm Verify. Upon return, the algorithm conducts another forward verification on the whole program, assuming that the unknown procedures are already verified against the discovered specifications. As in Calcagno et al. [6] , this final check rules out any potentially unsound pre/post pairs (due to the use of abstraction); therefore, it ensures the soundness of our verification.
The termination of our verification algorithms is based on two facts: the finiteness of verification input (program and its specifications), and the termination of our semantics. Firstly, all the loops and (recursive) algorithm invocations in the three verification algorithms are performed over the input program and specifications to be verified, where each time of iteration deals with part of the specifications/states and each invocation processes part of the input program structurally. Therefore, as long as all such processing terminates, the whole verification will terminate. This fact is further guaranteed with the termination of our abstract semantics, which can be proved by claiming the finiteness of program and logical variables, and hence the finiteness of all possible abstract states [9] . Hence we can conclude that our verification algorithm terminates with results of either fail or successfully returned specifications that the unknown procedures must conform.
Experiments and Evaluation
We have implemented the two abstract semantics and the verification algorithms with Objective Caml and evaluated them over some list processing programs to test their viability and precision. The results are in Table 1 . The first and second columns denote the programs used for evaluation [5, 8] and their time consumption, respectively. We manually hide some code in the original programs as calls to unknown procedures, for which we try to discover specifications during the verification process. The third column shows the partial specification for each program that is provided as input to our algorithm. The last column exhibits the discovered specifications for unknown procedures inside those programs. The programs are listed in Figure 6 . Table 1 . Experimental results for simple list processing programs.
Here we note down two observations on the experimental results. The first is that the discovered specifications for the unknown procedures are more general than we would have expected. Bear in mind that we have replaced some code from those programs with unknown calls. We have compared the inferred specifications for those unknown calls with the original code. The results show that the specifications derived by our algorithm not only fully capture the behaviors of the replaced code, but also suggest other possible implementations. A case in point is our motivating example findLast given in Sec 2, where the original code replaced by unknown call is y := x.next with the post-state x →y * ls(y, null) ∧ y =null. According to our result, the post-state can be more general, namely, ls(x, y) * ls(y, null) ∧ y =null. This suggests that as long as y is not null, the unknown call can traverse any number of nodes towards the tail of the list.
The second observation is about the last program listed in the table, a procedure called iWillFail, whose code is given as follows: This program is expected to be verified against the specification (Pre = ls(x, null), Post = ls(x, null) * ls(y, null)). Our verification fails and returns an additional formula ls(y, null) from our abduction process. A further analysis reveals that the failure is actually due to the given specification where the precondition Pre is too weak for the program to establish the postcondition Post: since y is not reachable from the parameters of the unknown call, no implementation of the unknown call can establish the postcondition Post involving y. The returned formula from our verification can then be used to strengthen the given specification. In this case, if we add ls(y, null) into Pre via separation conjunction, the verification will succeed with the specification (Pre u = ls(x, null), Post u = ls(x, null)) discovered for the procedure unknown.
We have also conducted some experiments to test our approach's performance and scalability. The results are shown in Table 2 . These results were achieved with an Intel Core 2 Quad CPU 2.66GHz with 8Gb memory. The verified programs are either source code from FreeRTOS [2] (list.c and tasks.c), or some working code created by the author (wd-stat.c, ctrins.c, kr-db.c, krbid.c, krpage.c, kdbadapt.c and kdbview.c). All these programs mainly deal with pointer-based linear data structures, such as singly-linked and/or doubly-linked lists. For example, list.c provides functions to initialize and modify lists, while tasks.c calls those functions to manipulate several lists during runtime. The other programs, wd-stat.c, ctrins.c, kr-db.c, krbid.c, krpage.c, kdbadapt.c and kdbview.c maintain some list-based vectors for runtime data storage, or hashtables implemented with a series of linked lists. Meanwhile, these programs have many function calls in them, like invocation of library functions or calls of other functions in the project.
As for verification purpose, we provide each function to be verified with its specification and run our algorithm over it. The unknown functions are manually assigned, such as library function calls which mainly consist of memory allocation functions like malloc, and functions that reside in other programs of the project. Since we only consider pointer safety of linked data structures at the moment, we did some modification to the programs to revise the code not relevant to our verification (like data types int and char for instance), such that the programs can be successfully verified.
The experimental results suggest that our approach might be able to scale up as a verification system for pointer safety, albeit we are trying to do more experiments, as well as optimize the algorithm, to justify this. What is more, we have tested the top-down feature of our abductive based verification system in the experiments. For instance, the specifications gained for "unknown" functions being invoked in tasks.c cohere with the ones for the corresponding callee functions in list.c. The same situation also applies to other test cases. Based on such results, we will investigate more towards this direction to uncover the power of a top-down abductive-based system as a viable alternative to the current bottom-up approaches [6, 13] .
Conclusion
It is a challenging problem to automatically verify (even pointer safety of) heapmanipulating imperative programs with unknown procedure calls. We propose a novel approach to this problem, which infers expected specifications for unknown procedures from their calling contexts during the verification process. The program is proven correct subject to the condition that the invoked unknown procedures meet the inferred specifications. We employ a forward shape analysis with separation logic and an enhanced abductive reasoning mechanism to synthesize both pre-and postconditions of the unknown procedure. As a proof of concept, we have also implemented a prototype system to test the viability of the proposed approach.
There are two possible future directions. One is to explore a more general solution for unknown calls in sequence as discussed, e.g., it might be possible for us to invent some heuristics to strengthen the postcondition for the first unknown call, so that the precondition of the second can be strengthened accordingly, to achieve more reasonable specifications for both. Another direction is to extend this method to an abstract domain combining separation and numerical information [7] , so that more general properties, such as memory safety and functional correctness, can be specified and verified. We envisage that, with the combined domain, the abstract semantics and analysis algorithms will remain conceivably the same, but the abduction will be redefined to discover the antiframes for the newly introduced numerical features.
